

## DESIGNING THE ISLAND OF PEACE : CHEJU AND REGIONAL PEACE

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The Cheju island had traditionally been known as the "island of exile and isolation". The geo-physical setting of the island had made it an ideal place for exile and deportation by different dynasties of the mainland. The fact that the ancestors of the large of the islanders were the gentry class nobles who were deported to the island after having been defeated in power struggles at the center reveals the very nature of the Cheju island. As the humiliating joke, "Men to Seoul, and Horses to Cheju," implies, the island has long been treated as being a remote, barren, and forgotten land.

It was only a recent phenomenon that the Cheju island began to attract mainlanders' attention. Since the 1960s, impacts of modernization, which swept the entire nation, reached the island. Diffusion of communication and transportation systems has made the island closer to the mainland. The modernization process as a whole has greatly influenced the Cheju island by transforming once secluded, self-reliant agrarian society into an island of tourism and hyper-development. Given its natural beauty, the Cheju island deserves such nicknames as "the pearl of Asia", "the dreamy island of honeymooners", and "the Hawaii of Asia". The changing social and economic landscape has, however, accompanied negative by-products too such as massive land speculation by mainlanders and the erosion of native culture and norms. The double-edge of the modernization process has renewed the debates on the nature and

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direction of Cheju development among islanders and between islanders and mainlanders, which has in turn polarized Cheju society. In this confrontation, the Cheju islanders have shown somewhat a defensive and xenophobic attitude.

Put a new momentum came, which has helped breaking the parochial world view of the Cheju islanders. That was the Cheju summit meeting between Roh Tae Woo and Gorbachev in April, 1991. The Cheju people began to rethink about the international locus of the Cheju island in line with Yalta, Potsdam, and especially Malta. Internationalization of the Cheju island has become a new slogan for the islanders. Given its tourist assets, it seems quite natural for the islanders to seek internationalization from the economic perspective. But the islanders have gone beyond it by exploring the possibility of making positive contributions to peace and stability in the region. The idea of declaring Cheju as an "island of peace" has emerged in this context.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to elaborate the idea of Cheju as "an island of peace", which prevails among the Cheju islanders. In this paper, we will try to suggest some concrete contents of the island of peace and to explore the rationales why Cheju needs to be declared as "an island of peace". We will also attempt to delineates practical strategies for building peace on the island.

## CHEJU AS AN ISLAND OF PEACE : AN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Cheju islanders quite often talk about the "island of peace". But they are seldom able to give its concrete picture. many believe that the idea has something to do with international tourism such as "No Entry Visa" and "International Free port". Such reasoning is not only misleading, but also distortive. Defining peace is an elusive task. In so much as the concept of peace is evasive, defining the idea of the island of peace is also difficult. Despite its definitional ambiguity as well as functional and spatial deversity, however, the concept of the island of peace can be defined in a simple and straight manner. We envisage Cheju-as-an-island-of-peace in the following terms.

First, the Cheju island should be demilitarized. By demilitarization, we mean the

elimination and prohibition of army, air force, and naval bases, the Prohibition of the deployment of all types of military weapons including nuclear ones, and the refusal of entry of all types of naval vessels for military purposes. The island maintains only police forces consistent with the safety of provincial security.

Second, Cheju as an island of peace should be the host place for all kinds of international, regional, national, and provincial conferences and dialogues on peace and order. Just limiting to the declaration of Cheju as an island of peace can be construed as a passive and even ego-centric, parochial gesture. Cheju should make positive contributions to the formation of regional peace and order in East Asia by providing a place for dialogue among conflicting parties. As part of such efforts, Cheju can manage to host a regularized, multilateral summit meeting on peace and order in East Asia. Obviously such a summit meeting will involve four big powers (the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Japan) and two Koreas. In order to regularize the summit meeting a la mode of G-7 summit meeting, a permanent secretariat needs to be established on the Cheju island.

Third, Cheju should be the international as well as regional center for resolving and mediating conflicts and disputes as well as researching and training on peace, we are implying Cheju as a Geneva of the Asia-Pacific. Two institutional arrangements can be conceived in this regard. One is the creation of a regional dispute resolution center on the Cheju island. The dispute resolution center can handle a wide variety of regional and bilateral disputes and conflicts ranging from the North-South Korean conflict, disputes over fishery zones, and other forms of conflicts. However, the proposed center does not pose any legal incongruence with the International Court of Justice. It is rather supplementary to it by mediating and resolving disputes before parties to them appeal to the International Court of Justice.

The other involves the establishment of the training and research center for regional peace on the Cheju island. The training and research center is a natural response to the complicated processes of peace-building in the region. Transforming a conflictual regional system to a peace system requires a sophisticated technical problem-solving approach since contemporary peace-building comprising confidence-building measures (CBMs), arms control, and arms limitation etc. entails negotiations over complex,

technical issues. The center can play a critical role in this regard by both training personnel involved in the negotiations and actively engaging in research over those issues. Equally important is the training of those who are responsible for educating on peace. The perception and practice of peace are ultimately decided by the nature and quality of education and subsequent political socialization. In this context, the training and research center can be utilized as a vehicle for spreading the message of peace consistent with the advent of the post-cold war era.

Fourth, the Cheju islanders must pursue active local efforts in actualizing the island of peace. They can include various institutional forms, one example would be the creation of "Cheju Peace Folk Village". As we shall discuss below, the Cheju island has traditionally been characterized by "Three-Nos (Sammu)" : namely, no thieves, no beggars, and no-gates. The "Three-Nos" symbolizes the primitive form of peace where insecurity and exploitation do not exist. The Cheju islanders can recreate such a primitive form of natural peace by establishing a peace folk village. Such a facility can be used as an important on-site educational device for young generations of the world. At the same time, the Cheju islanders can take an initiative to form a World Federation of Citizens' Peace Movements and to house its headquarters on the island.

Finally, the Cheju island should be a place for a balanced, decentralized, and indigenous development which is congruent with the idea of peace. In reality, peace cannot be conceived in separation from development. Freedom from insecurity is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the fulfillment of peace. Freedom from poverty, exploitation, and repression constitutes another critical dimension of peace. Development and peace are thus two sides of the same coin. In this sense, transforming the Cheju Island into an island of peace presupposes an ideal typical form of development on the island. As with peace, the concept of development is evasive. However, we can conceive the ideal typical development in terms of a sustainable, balanced, and harmonious development initiated and implemented by local inhabitants. The pursuit of the island of peace without the corresponding fulfillment of a balanced, decentralized development is tantamount to committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

## WHY CHEJU AS AN ISLAND OF PEACE? : THE RATIONALES

We have so far discussed about the institutional design of Cheju as an island of peace. What then necessitates and justifies Cheju as the island of peace? What are the rationales? Four major factors can be identified: push, pull, conversion, and facilitating factors.

Push Factors: The geo-political setting of the Cheju Island pushes it to opt for the island of peace. The East Asian security environment has rapidly changed. Up until very recently, the East Asian theater still remained as the last bastion of the Cold War confrontation. In contrast to the advent of the post-Cold War structure in the European theater, East Asia has witnessed a subtle form of arms race and moderately heightened military tension between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Of course, a sequence of events involving the collapse of the Soviet communist system and the bilateral elimination of tactical nuclear weapons by the U.S. and the Soviet Union has reshaped the political and security landscape of East Asia, and has made countries in the region more keenly feel the emerging pattern of the post-Cold War order.

Nonetheless, the East Asian theater is far from order and stability. American intention to project her power in the region has not yet disappeared. North and South Korea are still engaged in tense military confrontation. Japan and the Soviet Union have not yet resolved their dispute over the Northern Territories. There is a growing suspicion over Japan's remilitarization and the revival of old imperial hegemonic design, the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, China is another precarious variable in the regional security equation. Apart from the uncertain security setting, actual and potential disputes over natural resources (e.g., oil and fishery zones) make the region all the more volatile.

The Cheju island is closely intertwined with the vortex of the regional politics. As immediate examples, we can think about two plausible ways through which the Cheju island can be entangled with the regional security equation. One is the paradoxical outcome of the North-South Korean relations. Given the overall domestic, regional, and international development, both Koreas are very likely to expedite bilateral or

multilateral talks on confidence building measures and arms control. In this process, military redeployment as part of CBMs will emerge as the prime agenda of mutual negotiations, which are likely to produce an agreement on the backward deployment of offensive weapons by both koreas. On the part of South Korea, that could mean the deployment of offensive weapons to the Cheju Island, turning it into a massive military base. Such a development could turn the Cheju island as a potential military target of regional powers such as China and Japan. This being the case, the island will become more insecure.

The other concerns about a more remote possibility in that the Cheju island may become a new American military base. Three factors enable such reasoning: (1) Despite the advent of the post-Cold War, the U.S. has not yet abandoned her hegemonic dominance in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) In order to ensure hegemonic dominance, the U.S. is likely to continue her new maritime strategy based on offensive deterrence, forward deployment, and coalition warfare; (3) forward basing is necessary in order to carry out her strategic doctrines in the region. Therefore, if the U.S. is not successful in renewing base agreements with the philippines, the Cheju island can be singled out as an alternative site for basing.

In either way, the Cheju island cannot be insulated from regional political entanglements that could make it more insecure and vulnerabel. These potential and actual external pressures necessitate the Cheju islanders to take preemptive measures to prevent such developments. The idea of declaring Cheju as an island of peace results from the islander's perception of, and response to, the precarious regional security environment.

Pull Factors: The external security environment is merely a trigger. More important is the Cheju-islander's au the ntic sentiment on peace, which serves as a pull factor. The Cheju islanders commonly perceive peace as the imperative for all. Such perception has been shaped by the dynamic interplay of cultural tradition and historical memory.

The Cheju island is endowed with rich cultural heritage consistent with the idea of peace. As noted before, the "Three Nos" epitomizes the essence of Cheju's cultural tradition. No beggars imply the absence of poverty and exploitation. No thieves

symbolize the sense of security and stability. No gates mean communal harmony and trust as well as the absence of threats. Therefore, the "Three-Nos" presents an ideal type of natural peace rarely found in other parts of the world. As a matter of fact, the Cheju island had long maintained the state of natural peace until it was undermined by the waves of modernization. It is against the backdrop of this cultural tradition that the Cheju islanders have longed for the lasting peace on the island. Indeed creating the island of peace is equivalent of rebuilding the society of "Three-Nos."

Equally important is a sad historical memory associated with the April 3 Rebellion of 1948. The rebellion, a tragic by-product of ideological polarization and imprudence of the central government, cost 50,000 to 80,000 lives of the cheju islanders. The tragic event is still vividly remembered by the majority of the Cheju islanders. The memory of the tragic incident makes the cheju islanders think more strongly about the idea of peace that transcends ideological division and prevents the recurrence of bloody conflicts.

It is the confluence of these cultural heritages and historical memory that pulls the Cheju islanders more closely to the idea of the island of peace. The Cheju islanders are obliged to actualize peace on the island, and concomitantly, there is a deep and widespread grass-root level commitment to peace movement.

Facilitative Factors : There are several factors that could facilitate the realization of the island of peace. First, the transition of regional order from the Cold War to post-Cold War structure certainly serves as a positive factor to the idea of the island of peace. South Korea's Nordpolitik, the South Korean-Soviet summit meeting in Cheju, and the overall loosening of tense structure of military confrontation in the region and so on make the idea of the island of peace all the more feasible. Especially, the Roh-Gorbachev summit meeting has awakened the Cheju islanders to their new role in international affairs and peace-building.

Second, apart from this changing security environment, ideological relaxation, albeit limited, can be conceived of as being another facilitative factor. Up until very recently, peace has been often equated with the leftist or North Korean rhetorics. Military deterrence, fighting and winning strategies, and anti-communism had

prevailed over the idea of peace. Now the ideological rigidity of the cold war structure is on the wane. The idea of peace-building has become more attractive to both the Cheju islanders and mainlanders.

Conversion Factors: Push, pull, and facilitative factors discussed above are nothing but necessary conditions or input variables for actualizing the Cheju into an island of peace. They need to be organized and converted into a set of consistent and coherent actions. We believe that such a possibility has become more plausible than ever before. The central government in Seoul can serve as a key converter in this regard. Since President Roh Tai Woo proposed the East Asian summit meeting on regional peace and security at the 1988 United Nations, the South Korean government has continued to show interests in the idea of creating the zone of peace in the region. political leadership commitment on the level of central government can be easily linked to the "Cheju as an island of peace" formula. Once the central government is committed, the proposed idea can overcome legal and institutional barriers with relative ease.

Equally encouraging is the community-level commitment to the idea of peace-building. The Cheju islanders have shown enthusiastic support for the idea. For example, the Cheju International council, a grass-root organization, has already taken an initiative in this regard. Other grass-roots groups, educational institutions, and mass-media in the Cheju island have all sent positive signals. This citizen-level awareness of the importance of turning Cheju into an island of peace can be interpreted as another critical converting factor.

In view of the above, it is not exaggerating to argue that the overall internal and external mood for the idea of the island of peace has become mature. Now the issue at stake is how to take proper measures and steps. We will now consider strategies for peace-building on the Cheju island.

## HOW TO ACHIEVE THE ISLAND OF PEACE? : STRATEGIES FOR PEACE-BUILDING

Peace-building is not an easy task. New opportunities not with standing,



transforming Cheju into an island of peace is quite an immense, if not insurmountable, task. Several critical obstacles can be envisaged from the beginning. The United States and Japan may not welcome the idea, not only because they still have intention to project hegemonic power, but also because the idea is somewhat congruent with some of Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk proposals. We can also expect dissenting views from the conservative camp at the center which does not believe in the logic of peace. Even some Cheju islanders who are deeply indoctrinated by the cold war ideology could oppose the idea. More importantly, transforming Cheju into an island of peace presupposes enormous material, human, and infrastructural investment. The resource limitations resulting from the very size of the island could fundamentally hinder the actualization of the island of peace.

How to overcome these barriers? First, there must be communal unity on the part of Cheju islanders. The appearance of communal harmony in Cheju is quite deceptive. Indeed, Cheju natives are all interrelated through blood, school, and local ties. Nevertheless, the Cheju society is deeply divided. Recent debates on the Special Law on Cheju's Comprehensive Development reveal this trend par excellence. The lasting impacts of the April 3 Rebellion also polarize Cheju society. Communal unity and harmony is the prerequisite for the creation of the island of peace. In this sense, the hidden truth of the April 3 Rebellion should be revealed, and fractured scars of the past should be healed through due procedures. At the same time, the central government should avoid the inertial pursuit of top-down approaches concerning Cheju development that fragments and divides Cheju society.

Once communal unity and harmony is ensured, there must be a systemic, organizational approach on the grass-root level. In this regard, the Cheju islanders can organize a Citizens' Committee for Peace which would comprise broad functional, regional, and generational representatives of Cheju society. The Cheju International Council can play a critical role in forming such organization. The Committee, once formed, should engage in various activities such as lobbying, petition drive, letter writing, and peace education for the Cheju islanders. It should set the Cheju Provincial Assembly as its first target, and persuade the Assembly to pass the resolution on the island of peace.

But as we are all well aware of, community-level activities alone are insufficient. The adoption of the resolution by the Cheju Provincial Assembly can be easily invalidated by the central government for legal, political, and institutional reasons. Therefore, persuading policy-makers at the central government level becomes an urgent task. As part of efforts to lobby the central government, the Committee should organize national networks that can render nationwide support for the idea of the island of peace. In doing so, the Cheju islanders residing in mainland can become a valuable asset.

Finally, national-level efforts should be synchronized with international-level campaigns. The Cheju islanders alone, even with support of the central government, cannot influence foreign policy behavior of the United States, Japan, and China. In order to influence them, there must be international networking efforts with peaceniks of countries in the region. In this regard, the Cheju islanders can form a citizens' alliance for peace in the Asia-Pacific, titled "The Pacific Link for Peace." Given the proliferation of peace movements in Asia-Pacific countries, the formation of such networks should not be that difficult. Leading figures of peace movement in the region such as Professor Majid Tehranian (University of Hawaii), Professor Andrew Mack (Australian National University), and Representative James Shon of Hawaii have all shown their interests in participating in such networking efforts. By creating and maintaining close cooperation with peace organizations in other countries, the Cheju islanders can achieve their goal easily. Apart from this citizen networking, cheju provincial assembly men can actively pursue their own networking with local politicians of other nations. At the same time, cheju islanders residing in Asia-Pacific countries should be fully utilized for this purpose.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Creating an island of peace in Cheju island does not imply the pretext for "no-visa entry" of foreigners to the island. It is not designed as an instrument of tourist development either. The Peace-building efforts do not aim at benefiting certain segments of Cheju society, while victimizing others. It starts with the fundamental

assumption of positive sum outcomes in which everyone, Cheju islanders or not, benefits, and nobody loses. Therefore, the Cheju islanders should escape from allergic reactions to the idea resulting from the victim mentality. As noted before, realizing the island of peace is not easy. Rocky road is ahead. But we should overcome the barriers with communal harmony, unity, and collective wisdom.

## 「평화의 섬」을 위한 제안

문정인, 양길현, 양영철, 현인택

지난 4월 「한·소」정상회담의 제주개최이후 제주도의 국제적 위상이 크게 새로워졌다. 이를 계기로 하여 제주를 「평화의 섬」으로 선포, 동북아의 안정과 평화에 공헌하려는 시민수준의 노력이 가시화되고 있다. 본 논문은 이와 관련하여 「평화의 섬」의 성격, 명분 그리고 그 실현전략 등에 대한 논의를 개괄적으로 다루고 있다.

우선 「평화의 섬」이란 무엇을 의미하는가? 「평화의 섬」은 결코 「No Visa」등을 통해 외국관광객의 유입을 극대화시키려는 관광진흥수단을 의미하지 않는다. 「평화의 섬」의 기본전제는 제주를 비무장, 비군사지대화시키는 것이며, 이를 바탕으로 동북아지역에 있어서 평화에 관한 국제회의, 연구, 훈련의 중심지로 제주를 부상시키려는 시민수준의 노력을 의미한다. 이와 더불어 평화박물관, 평화민속촌을 설립하는 동시에 「세계평화운동연맹」(가칭)의 본부를 제주에 유치할 수도 있을 것이다. 이를 위해 한국정부가 중심이 되어 미국, 일본, 소련, 중국, 북한 등이 참여하는 동북아국가 평화정상회담을 제주에 유치하는 것도 바람직하다.

다른 한편으로 평화란 비군사화를 넘어서서 균형된 발전을 토대로 하여 이룩되는 것이다. 분배적 정의와 사회복지의 실현을 통해서 계층간 갈등의 소지를 줄여나가는 것이야말로 평화의 적극적인 내용이다. 이를 위해서는 지방자치시대에 걸맞게 시, 군, 도의회의 역할이 증시되고 도민이 주도하는 각 직능단체와 사회운동의 정책적 참여와 진언이 요망된다. 이런 의미에서 현하 쟁점이 되고 있는 <특별법>을 도민이 주도하여 균형된 발전과 분배적 정의를 이룩해야 한다는 차원에서 재조정될 필요가 있다.

그러면 어떤 연유에서 제주가 「평화의 섬」이 되어야 하는가? 그 첫째는 지정학적 이유다. 제주도민이 일심단결하여 「평화의 섬」으로 선포하지 않을 시 제주도는 동북아 군사대결의 소용돌이 속으로 말려들어갈 수 있기 때문이다. 남북군축협상의 가속화와 그에 따른 한국의 공세형 무기의 후방배치, 「포스트-필리핀」이후의 미 태평양전력의 전진배치 등은 제주도의 군사기지화 가능성을 높여주고 있다. 바로 이러한 움직임에 효율적으로 대처하기 위해서도 「평화의 섬」 선언은 바람직하다 하겠다.

둘째, 제주도의 문화·역사적 전통과 유산이다. 제주의 「삼무-三無」, 즉 거지, 도둑, 대문이 없다는 문화적 유산은 평화의 가장 원초적 정형을 의미한다. 이러한 문화적 유산을 복

원한다는 점에서도 「평화의 섬」구상은 의미있다 하겠다. 더욱 중요한 것은 「4·3사건」이란 역사의 비극이 다시는 일어나지 않도록 하기 위해서도 「평화의 섬」구상은 당위론적인 것이라 하겠다.

마지막으로 탈냉전의 분위기 그리고 한국정부의 북방정책 등은 「평화의 섬」선포에 따른 내외적 분위기를 성숙시켜주고 있다.

그러면 「평화의 섬」구상은 어떻게 실현해야 할 것인가? 첫째, 제주도민들의 내적 단결이 선행되어야 한다. 「4·3사건」, 「특별법」등으로 분열되어 있는 제주사회에 새로운 단합과 조화의 구심점을 마련하고 이를 토대로 시민수준의 평화운동이 조직되어야 한다. 둘째, 중앙정부에 대한 적극적 로비가 있어야 한다. 세번째, 미국과 일본등의 예상되는 반대에 대비하여 「태평양 평화연대(Pacific Link for Peace)」등과 같은 국제적 평화조직을 제주도민들의 주도하에 구성, 국제적 여론조성을 기해야 할 것이다.