

From Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk to Cheju : The Soviet Perspective on Regional Peace

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Sometimes you can hear people say that the "cold war" has not ended, that it has been simply transferred to the Asia-Pacific region (APR). To what extent does that opinion correspond to the real state of things?

That's true that a considerable part of the military political structures, the global and regional contradictions, that came into shape here during the time of "cold war", are still in existence. Still, at the same time it would be wrong to assert that the warm winds of detente have not reached that region at all. If instead of comparing the situation here with what is going on in Europe, we look back and take in all the changes that have taken place in the APR in some past five years after M.S. Gorbachev's well-known speech made in the city of Vladivostok, then it will become clear that the situation in the region has already started changing in principle, the atmosphere here has become considerably warmer and under its influence the ices of the "cold war" have begun melting little by little.

It stands to reason that it did not happen all of a sudden, it could not have happened without overcoming the inertia in the old way of thinking first. The impetus of new trends have been steadily gathering speed, while uncoordinated initiatives separate political events of the past two years have more and more vividly been shaping as an irreversible tendency for overcoming the remaining obstacles on the way to a reliable system of regional security.

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Vladivostok : the new way of thinking in the APR comes into being

There are quite a few people who believe that up till recently, including the time after Gorbachev came to power, the leadership of the Soviet Union concentrated its foreign policy in the Western direction and did not show much interest in the Western direction and did not show much interest in the APR. In many respects that belief seems to be inaccurate. The USSR has always been interested in the APR, and it is interested in it today as well. It is quite a different matter, how, in what forms and actions it is displayed, how external, international factors have been promoting or preventing those interests from transforming into a practical policy at this or that stage of historical development.

In the 40s - the early 50s the leadership of the USSR viewed the APR as a stage for development of national democratic revolutions under the guidance of the communist parties of the corresponding countries. Starting with the middle 50s the USSR took a more realistic position and shifted accents into economic and political cooperation with the nationalistic regimes in the developing countries, by which forcing the USA to establish a whole system of official aid for development. In the 60s unfortunately, the traditional ideological confrontation between the USA and the USSR was supplemented by the fight of the USSR against China that began openly claiming hegemony in the communist and Left-wing movements. The defeat of the conception and practice of socialist orientation brought about decreased influence and activity of the USSR in the APR, as a result of which it was forced to narrow down the sphere of its direct actions and (very doubtful) influence over some countries with national democratic orientation. At the same time those "allied" relations were gradually becoming a bigger and bigger economic and political burden for the Soviet state, for it was sinking deeper and deeper into a profound crisis of all its social structures bringing into the open at last the real character of Stalin's model of pseudo-socialism that can lead only into a blind alley.

After Gorbachev came to power there was proclaimed the conception of many-facet, multi-farious charater of the contemporary world, which in its essence means denial of of bi-polar structure of inter-national relations. It resulted in a more even distribution of attention and political activity of the USSR among the majority of the world community. The same is true about the countries of the APR. In many of his public appearances in 1985 - the first half of 1986 Gorbachev emphasized the point about the USSR belonging to Asia, the necessity of development of its Far-Eastern areas, and already in May 1985 put forward the idea of an "all-Asia forum". Time and again he spoke about the immense role of the region of Asia and the Pacific ocean¹⁾ in world-wide development. However, in the course of 1985 - the first half of 1986, these new guide-lines of Gorbachev's leadership, that still had to be fully taken in, did not find their adequate reflection in the practical policy, pursued by the USSR Ministry of foreign affairs, that in many aspects continued to follow the well-beaten tracks of the old way of thinking. To a considerable degree it was done due to the inertia of the past and artificial conservation (through the efforts of the most conservative forces in the USA and the USSR) of the elements and structures of bi-polarity. Only after Gorbachev's speech, made in the city of Vladivostok (July 27, 1986) a break in that situation became evident²⁾. So, what problems, relevant to the APR, were touched upon in that speech by Gorbachv?

He said that in the APR there was not only absent anything like Helsinki process, but those things, if any, that were changing, were not changing for the better. Gorbachev spoke in favour of "joint building up of new, just relations" in the APR. As one of promising goals he put forward an idea of a Pacific conference (like that held in Helsinki) with participation of all the "countries gravitating towards the ocean" as well as inclusion of the APR into the general process of establishing a comprehensive system of inter-national security, that he had suggested back in the February of 1986 at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. To reach that remote goal it is necessary to effect some confidence-building measure (such as, for instance, the

1) See D. Heinzinger's article in "Journal of East and West Studies", vol. XXII, No. 1, Spring-Summer, 1988, pp.72-74.

2) See the newspaper "Pravda" of July 28, 1986.

curtailment of activity of military fleets on the Pacific ocean, especially those that are equipped with nuclear weapons; restrictions in rivalry in the sphere of anti-submarine weapons, etc.) and with this aim it was suggested that a conference be held (in the city of Vladivostok or some other seaside city of the USSR) on confidence-building measure and non-use of force. Gorbachev also suggested that armed forces and conventional armament be radically reduced to the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

In his speech Gorbachev also underlined the necessity for the USSR to apply dynamism to its bi-lateral relations "with all, without exception", countries of the APR. he enumerated almost all the countries, but it was evident that most attention and biggest place were given to the relations with China ("the biggest socialist state"). Gorbachev said that those relations had improved and expressed readiness at any time and at any place to discuss the matter of additional measures directed at creating the situation of good neighbourly relations. Also, two times Gorbachev touched on the matter of the relations with Japan, especially in terms of economic cooperation. He said, "The order of the day calls for an exchange of visits at the highest level". When speaking about the USA, Gorbachev mentioned a letter he received from Reagan, which required attentive consideration.

At the same time, Gorbachev did not restrict himself to wishes and suggestions concerning the future only. He made a statement on unilateral actions by the USSR that might have seemed insignificant at the moment, but that proved, from the point of view of later development of events, to be the beginning of serious shifts in the foreign political policy of the USSR. In particular, he meant the negotiations held with Mongolia and concerned with the withdrawal of a considerable part of Soviet troops from that country. He also said that before 1986 was out, 6 regiments would have been returned home from Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev's speech still bore the imprint of old thinking, the old bipolar approach of ideological confrontation, which in general reflected the real structure and character of inter-state relations typical of that period. For, even in the new way of thinking were still very, very modest. Even the Reykjavik meeting (October 1986) was still a matter of the future, to say nothing of more serious advances in the field of the disarmament negotiation. As for the APR, there military

political confrontation in 'two-system'spirit ('socialism' against capitalism) still held water, build-up of military potential proceeded along the same lines, and up to 90 and more percent of armament for each of the sides was supplied from the USSR or the USA correspondingly. Besides, the USA continued playing the "Chinese card" against the USSR. There was developing American-Chinese military cooperation, for the first time waschips of the USA Navy visited Qingdao in November 1986, China was given some types of military technology and equipment, etc."

In view of the above-said it is not surprising that even the lexicon of the speech was still of the traditional offensive anti-imperialist character, while the general conception of external political interrelations in the region was based on certain confrontation to American imperialism and proteation of "our friends and allies" as well as "their borders" from it; arising from the fight against the forces of neo-colonialism in alliance with the non-align ment movement; arising from solidarity with "our friends" (Mongolia, North Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, Kampuchea) in opposition to the military "triangle", formed by Washinton-Tokyo-Seoul. The solution of the Gambodian problem was presumed to be possible only in a non-alter-native way, without any participation of the UN and the neighbouring states of South-East Asia. The approach to the promblem of unification of Korea was expressed in the traditional support of the position of the KPDR, accompanied by an intensive military cooperation of the USSR with that country, begun before the perestroika was under way.

By giving an assessment to Gorbachev's speech made in Vladivostok as a whole, it is necessary to say that it was only the "first swallow", so that it did not make (and could not possibly make) a "summer", but which, nonetheless, heralded the approaching of a thaw in the regional atmoshere. The Vladivostok speech did not yet spell the repudiation of the old policy, but it was already the beginning of its renunciation. It was birth of a new course at a time when Gorbachev himself did not yet clearly perceive the scale and profundity of the tasks related to internal perestroika, when he did not completely realize all the complex and many-facet

3) See "Asian Perspective", vol. 14, No.1, Spring-Summer 1990, pp.79~83.

character of specific problems and contradictions, existing in the APR, while his new plans and political targets were rendered futile by the inertia of the old approaches, characteristic of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In its turn the USA was interested in the status-qua in the APR and was far from being in a hurry to meet Gorbachev admitted himself later on, when answering the questions of the Japanese newspaper "Asahi simboon", the continued "cold war" made the leadership of the USSR "line up priorities" depending on military potential that was confronting us.⁴ That means that in the past few years the primary attention has been of necessity concentrated on the West.

Krasnoyarsk : a new stage in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy in the APR

In spite of all the things said above, the elements of new thinking, evident in Gorbachev's speech made in Vladivostok, were further developed, also in practical policy. In the course of some two years, separating "Krasnoyarsk" (September 1988) from "Vladivostok"; both internal and external situations changed considerably. In 1987 there was held the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and in 1988 - the XIX party conference, as a result of which some hard liners were ousted from the summit of party-state power; the situation in the country became more open and freedom of public opinion extended to involve the sphere of external policy; the influence of the scientific circles on the process of formation of that policy became enhanced. The above-mentioned factors had an effect of speeding up the process of departure from the former strategy of "international revolutionary process" with its "ideological" priorities. In practical policy it found its expression in the decision taken by the soviet government to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, in changing its views on possible ways of solving the Kampuchean problem in favour of doing it with the participation of the ASEAN countries, in the started withdrawal of the Soviet

4) See the newspaper "Pravda" of December 30, 1990.

troups from Mongolia. Also, there were continued practical efforts aimed at strengthening and extending "good neighbourly relations" with China: a consulate agreement was reached in September 1986, as a result of which consulates were opened soon after that in Leningrad and Shanghai, and later on - in Kiev, Alma-Ata, Khabarovsk, on one side, and in Shenyang, Urumchi, Kuangchou (Canton), on the other side. The February of 1987 saw the first negotiations on the issue of the frontiers. Trade, economic and scientific cooperation were quick to expand. All that made it possible for Gorbachev to say that the USSR was ready to "begin without delay preparation for a Soviet-Chinese summit". In that period the USSR indeed succeeded in rendering new dynamism to its bilateral relations with the majority of countries of the APR. Thus, already in November 1986, for the first time, the USSR took part as observer in the V session of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Vancouver (and in 1988 - in Osaka). And finally, on a global scale, in December 1987 the USA and the USSR signed the INF treaty, considerable progress was achieved in the negotiations on reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Also, to meet the requests of a number of states the Soviet leadership agreed to extend the validity of the 1987 treaty to the Asian part of the country, as a result of which 400 medium-range missiles were subject to destruction."

Such was the changed situation in which Gorbachev made his second speech related to the APR in the city of Krasnoyarsk.⁵⁾ It can be said that speech was equally remarkable not only for what was said in it but also by what was missing in it: it was absolutely free from the former revolutionary, anti-imperialist, ideological rhetoric. His speech was permeated with striving to put an end to military confrontation, to settle the existing conflicts, hint at opposing the socialist countries to the USA-Japan-South Korea "triangle". In fact Gorbachev proposed that another "triangle", formed by the USA-China-the USSR, be put "inside out": instead of card (to strengthen its cooperation with the USA), Gorbachev suggested mutual cooperation both with China and with the USA as with two permanent members of the UN Security Council and establishment of a mechanism to negotiate the problems of

5) "International Herald Tribune", March 28, 1990.

6) See the newspaper "Izvestiya" of September 18, 1985.

security in the APR. In terms of control over armament Gorbachev gave assurance that the USSR would not augment quantitatively any types of nuclear weapons in the APR and addressed the USA with an appeal to refrain from its further build-up. He also suggested regular consultations between major naval powers to prevent build-up of naval forces; and reduction in military confrontation in the areas where the distance between the coast lines of the USSR, the CPR, Japan, North and South Korea becomes small. The speech also contained suggested measures to prevent incidents in the open sea and air space and suggestions aimed at mutual closing down of military bases in Cam Ranh and on the Philippines. It also contained a call for discussion of "initial approaches" to establishing new relations in the Asia-Pacific basin within the framework of a meeting at the level of foreign ministers.

However, the most sensational evidence of the new thinking in Gorbachev's speech was the fact that South Korea was mentioned in it quite a few times without any negative context, which distinguished it from the one made in Vladivostok. After pointing out that the situation on the Korean peninsula was a complicated one, Gorbachev said that there as well were signs of opening prospects for a dialogue between the North and South. Further on he returned to the Korean issue and spoke about the "possibility for establishing economic ties with South Korea". That was, without any doubt, a fundamental departure from the former one-sided orientation at the North. It seems that the change in Gorbachev's views and position was brought about by a number of important factors. Among those it is possible to name the following : a) one week prior to his speech in Krasnoyarsk Kim Il Sung delivered an address on the occasion of the 40 anniversary of the KPDR, which left not a ghost of doubt that the "great leader" was not going to change anything in the country and completely ignored the perestroika going on in the USSR; b) South Korea has attained exceptional economic achievements and might become an important partner for cooperation with the USSR; and c) the year of 1988 saw significant changes in the political life of South Korea : in February there came to power President Roh Tae-woo, who, on June 29 1987 during the election campaign, put forward a slogan for democratization of South Korea, and after he came to power he began to put that slogan into practice. Also, President Roh Tae-woo proved to be far-sighted in his

assessment of the changes in the international situation and initiated the policy of "Northern diplomacy", i.e. improvement of relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR, thinking quite rightly that the "round-about way" was nearer the aim of the unification of the country". In any case, that new approach, introduced by Gorbachev meant one more serious step in terms of deideologization of foreign policy and transfer to the position of sober realism.

From Krasnoyarsk to Chejudo : the train is gathering speed

The period of time between Gorbachev's speech and his visit to Cheju island witnessed the intensification of international contacts in the APR, Soviet Far-Eastern policy became more active and resulted in quite considerable successes. All that happened on the background of deepening relaxation in tension; further retreat of "cold war" (summits on Malta in 1989 and in Washington in the summer of 1990), "the velvet revolutions" in Eastern Europe and the historic breakdown of the Berlin wall. That the new way of thinking was fruitful for the inter-state relations was proved in practice during the war in the Persian Gulf. Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait did not serve (as it might have been the case in the years of the "cold war") as a detonator for a new (and maybe the last one before a universal catastrophe) round of global conflicts. The world community came out of those events with a big confidence in the possibility of building up a new world order and renewal of general ideological confrontation on a global level has come to an end. And that, in its turn, created favourable atmosphere for new breakthroughs on a regional level as well.

Below, I shall speak in brief about most, in my opinion, significant achievements of Soviet foreign policy in the APR within the period under review:

1. In December 1988 Soviet leadership made public and began to put into practice

7) See "Information Service on the Unification question on the Korean Peninsula", June 1991, No.3, pp.42~43.

its intention to reduce unilaterally armed forces in the Asian part of the country by 200 thousand men, including 120 thousand, stationed in the Far East. (By the way, in proportion to the total number of troops stationed on that territory, that is more than reduction effected in the European part of the USSR). In the course of that process there were disbanded 12 aviation regiments, 16 warships (including 9 submarines) were decommissioned⁸⁾. On the whole, it was planned to reduce the Soviet Pacific fleet by one third. Apart from that, the Soviet troops were being withdrawn from the countries of foreign Asia (Mongolia, as well as combat aircraft from the Cam Ranh base).

2. In spite of stubborn resistance on the part of the Defense Ministry of the USSR there has begun a real process of "deconservation" of our main Far Eastern centre—the city of Vladivostok. It has become a host city for conducting international conferences (when addressing one of them in September 1990 the former foreign minister Shevardnadze suggested that foreign ministers of Asian countries get together in Vladivostok in the autumn of 1993 in order to work out some principles of foreign policy for the region).

In September 1990 a detachment of warships of the 7th fleet of the USA, based in Japan, visited Vladivostok. In January 1991 the Ministry of Defense of the USSR issued permission to open the Vladivostok airport for planes of foreign aircompanies. At present the matter of opening the maritime port for foreign ships under consideration. In July 1991 Vladivostok was visited by General K. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has been completed as well as that of vietnam's from Cambodia—which has created important external prerequisites for solving those major regional conflicts.

4. The events described above have promoted a breakthrough in the Soviet-Chinese relations. The May of 1989 saw Gorbachev's visit to Peking that marked a decisive turn of the two countries towards good-neighbourliness and cooperation. Thanks to that event in combination with the improved Soviet-American relations all attempts at

8) See "Far Eastern Economic Review", June 27, 1991, v.152, No.26, p.23.

"playing" by making stakes on these or those angles of the USA-the CPR-the USSR triangle have become a matter of the past.

5. But it is the Soviet-South Korean relations that can boast of most swift and successful changes in the period under review. It is possible to say that out of the countries of the region South Korea has used the new international situation most energetically and with maximum effect, resulting in a major breakthrough in its "Northern diplomacy". Soon after the USSR and the Republic of Korea established consular relations, they were followed by a meeting of the president, Gorbachev and Roh, in San Francisco (June 1990), and after that there were established diplomatic relations (September 1990). Already in December of the same year President Roh came to the USSR on an official visit, as a result of which there was signed the Declaration on general principles of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea, that laid down the main principles of new relations between the two states and stated the existence of identity of positions of the two countries in the matter of establishing a safe and just peace. It gives me pleasure to say that the research institute that I represent here has made a considerable contribution (Sometimes moving ahead of the USSR Foreign Ministry) into the development of the relations between the USSR and South Korea.

6. Considerable steps have also been taken in the way of normalizing the relations between the USSR and the Korean People's Democratic Republic (in terms of their transfer to normal inter-states relations). The interrelations between these two countries have started losing the character of "compulsory friendship", under which the USSR, by force of false interpretation of "proletarian internationalism", was kind of automatically obliged to support the policy conducted by the KPDR. It is intriguing that that strange "internationalism" somehow far from always acted the other way. As a result the relations were not those of a "partron" and a "client" (as they were presented in publications and propaganda in the West), but more like those of "a dog's head and tail", under which the "tail" turns the "head" around. Nowadays the fears to "offend" the leadership of the KPDR have receded and their place has been taken by the policy of common sense. Such a policy makes it possible for the USSR to play a more effective role as a "gabetween" in the mottler of unification of the

North and the South and prompt the North to think about necessity to pursue a more flexible home and foreign policy.

7. No dramatic changes in the relations between the USSR and the USA within the framework of the APR have taken place. The USA here has undoubted naval superiority and it does not feel like holding any negotiations with the USSR. Nonetheless, in the period under review we can speak about a markedly growing interest both on the part of the USA and on the part of the USSR in maintaining stability in the APR, in achieving a political solution of a major regional problem involving the Korean peninsula (the USA, in particular, has expressed its agreement in principle to keep exchanging views with the USSR concerning its nuclear weapons based lower the 38 parallel). It was this new atmosphere in the relations between the USSR and the USA that made it possible for Cheney, the American defense secretary, to announce in possible for Cheney, the American defense secretary, to announce in February 1990, certainly very modest, but still reduction of the USA armed forces, stationed in the APR, by 10 percent by 1993 (including 5 thousand men and 2 thousand staff, personnel of the military bases in South Korea and 7 thousand men in Japan).⁹⁾

8. The activization of dipolmatic, political and cultural contacts of the USSR with Japan reached its culmination in April 1991 when Gobachev came to Tokyo on an official visit. However, the expected breakthrough in the solution of the territorial issue and conclusion of a peace treaty did not materialize. That was due to, first of all, the aggravation of the internal situation in the USSR, which made any attempt at a compromise solution of the territorial dispute extremely explosive. In these conditions Japan continues rejecting any initiative, made by the USSR, concerning security in the APR. Also, cold reception was given to the suggestion, made by Gobachev during his visit, on arranging a quinti-lateral meeting of representatives of such great powers of Asia and the Pacific ocean, as the USA, the USSR, China, Japan and India. It seems that that suggestion is permeated with the spirit, typical of the Foreign Ministry in the past, that was always putting forward "new" initiatives without taking into

9) TASS, March 22, 1991: "International Herald Tribune", March 28, 1990

consideration their feasibility. On the one hand such a suggestion increases the number of participants at the expense of India, that is not a Far Eastern country, and by this highly complicates a possible agenda. On the other hand, it ignores both parts of Korea and the countries of the ASEAN, causing distrust for the "great-power" composition of the suggested meeting. Such immature initiatives may bring more harm than good.

Chejudo and the prospects for security in the APR

The modest results of the Tokyo meetings were to a considerable extent made up for by a short but fruitful visit of Gorbachev to South Korea on April 19-20, 1991. It's been a third meeting at a summit level in the past ten months. The negotiations between President Gorbachev and President Poh on the island of cheju resulted in breakthroughs in the political and economic spheres, whose importance is not restricted to these two countries and will effect (is already effecting) the situation in the region as a whole.

From the political point of view the visit has paved the way for UN membership for both Koreas. Gorbachev's statement,¹⁰⁾ made on Cheju and the consultations with the leadership of China that followed during Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow showed to Pyongyang how useless it is to continue further resistance and counteraction to admission of South Korea to the UN. As a result, contrary to the expectations of Western politicians North Korea made public on May 30, 1991 tis decision to join that organization. On July 2 the corresponding document was sent over to the name of the UN Secretary General. It stands to reason that the Republic of Korea has taken a similar step, as a result of which on August 8 the security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly to admit both states to the UN.

The mere fact of official recognition of reality that has long been in existence - the two sovereign states on the Korean peninsula will lead to relaxation of tension and open the way to normalization of their relations, development of economic, trade and

10) See "The Economist", June 1, 1991.

cultural interrelations. There has been much written in the press about the isolation of the KPDR, but that too proved to be wrong. There was a danger of its being isolated and it prompted the KPDR to take the first steps towards integration with the world community. That's why one cannot help agreeing with President Roh's opinion that Korea may be united in the middle 90s or at least before the present century is out, the opinion he expressed at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on June 17, 1991.¹¹⁾

Already we have enough facts testifying to gradual recession of isolation of the KPDR. In September Pyongyang witnessed the meeting of the ministers of Asian countries within the framework of Group 77, in which the governmental delegation of South Korea also participated. The month of May saw the first direct commercial exchange between North and South Korea: 5000 tonnes of South Korean rice were swapped for 11 thousand tonnes of cement and 30 thousand tonnes of coal from North Korea (prior to that their trade was effected via third countries). A general agreement provides for supplies of 100 thousand tonnes of rice (estimated to be worth 35 million US doll), in exchange for cement and coal.¹²⁾ In June, this year it became clear that the KPDR would not be against South Korean investments into its economy, if they were effected via third countries.¹³⁾ In short, ice is getting very thin, and the further, the deeper North Korea will be drawn into the vortex of international life and interrelations with the South.

The second important political achievement of that visit is that it gave an impetus to the KPDR for changing its position in the matter of international inspection of its nuclear programmes. For the first time the Soviet Union was open with its criticism of the North Korean nuclear programme and Moscow voiced publicly its threat to stop its supplies of nuclear fuel to North Korea if the latter rejected international verification.¹⁴⁾ At the same time the USSR is doing its best to persuade the USA to give guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang agreeing to the IAEA's inspection of its nuclear objects. Lately public

11) "Reuter" (Seoul), June 17, 1991.

12) "Korea Business World", May 1991, v.7, No.5, p.38.

13) "Izvestiya", June 24, 1991.

14) "Far Eastern Economic Review", May 9, 1991, v.151, No.19, p.15.

opinion in the USA is more and more inclined to believe that there is no longer any need to have nuclear weapons in the South of the Korean peninsula and that it can be taken away from it in exchange for a changed position of the KPDR. It must be all that taken together as well as desire not to remain isolated, that made North Korea simultaneously declared its intention to become a member of the UN and its acceptance of the IAEA's inspection. It has even gone as far as initialling the preliminary agreement with the IAEA, showing by it how serious were its intentions. However, in the final communique the Korean representative said that inspection would not be allowed as long as American nuclear weapons remained in the South of the Korean peninsula.¹⁵⁾

During his visit Gorbachev also offered to sign with South Korea a treaty on good neighbourliness and cooperation. President Roh reacted agreeing on principle. Later on, in the middle of August in South Korea there were press reports with reference to governmental sources that the USSR and the Republic of Korea would discuss the matter of signing such a treaty in the course of the coming General Assembly of the UN. Almost at the same time it was reported that President ROH in his address to the session of the UN General Assembly would speak in favour of an international conference with participation of the USSR, the USA, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the KPDR for solving the problems concerned with the situation on the Korean peninsula.¹⁶⁾

In economic terms the meeting on cheju island gave an impetus for speeding up bilateral and regional cooperation. Unanimous opinion was expressed that by the middle of the 90s trade turnover between the two countries would go up to reach a mark of 10 billion US doll. It will be a great leap, considering the fact that in 1989 it was 600 million US doll., in 1990 - about 900 million, while in the current year it is expected to be 1.5 billion doll. Such an orientatior creates a favourable atmosphere for about 50 investment projects planned for the second half of this year. "A green light" has beer given to the big Sakhalin gas project, the realization of which may involve third

15) Ibid.: "International Herald Tribune", May 31, 1991; "Komsomolskaya pravda", July 18, 1991.

16) "Izvestiya", August 12, 1991, August 16, 1991.

countries (including the USA and Japan).¹⁷⁾

Thus, it can be said that as a result of long and many-facet efforts, made in the period between "Vladivostok" and "Cheju" a long way has been walked by the sides that caused evolution in their positions to bring them nearer, to overcome the inertia of old thinking. The APR has become a little bit nearer to the prospect of creating a system of regional security. "The ices of the cold war" have largely melted. And although the "cold war" military political structures are still in existence, what they were founded on-ideological confrontation-is disappearing before our own eyes.

17) "Compass", No.88 (TASS, May 8, 1991); "Far Eastern Economic Review", May 9, 1991, v.151, No.19, p.18.

“블라디보스톡에서 제주까지 : 소련의 동북아외교정책”

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서방관측통은 소련의 외교정책이 구라파중심적이며 동북아를 포함한 아시아·태평양지역에는 큰 관심을 표명하지 않는 것으로 분석해 왔다. 그러나 이러한 분석은 잘못된 것이다. 1940년대 이후 소련지도부는 아시아·태평양지역을 민족민주주의혁명 확산의 주요대상으로 선정하고 그에 따른 적극적 외교정책을 전개해 왔다. 바로 이러한 사회주의 혁명수출이라는 스탈린식 사이비 사회주의관에 기초하여 북한, 월맹, 몽고등과의 맹목적 동맹관계를 추구해 왔다.

소련이 대 동북아외교정책에 급선회를 보이기 시작한 것은 고르바초프의 등장과 더불어서이다. 1985년 소련지도자로 부상한 고르바초프는 1986년 7월 27일 블라디보스톡선언을 제안하면서 소련의 동아시아정책 전환을 강력히 시사했다. 이 선언은 구라파에 신뢰구축을 가져오게한 “헬싱키”형 신뢰구축 모델을 아시아·태평양 지역에도 적용하려는 시도였다. 동선언 중 “아시아·태평양 안보협력회의”의 제창은 새로운 발상이긴 하지만, 전반적으로 냉전적 이데올로기에서 벗어나지 못한 외교정책의 발현이라 할 수 있다.

소련의 동북아 정책에 있어 신사교적 지평을 개척한 것은 1988년 9월의 “크라스노야르스크” 선언이라 할 수 있다. 동선언은 종래의 “민족혁명, 반제”라는 이념로선에서 벗어나 아시아·태평양 지역에 진정한 의미의 평화를 구축하려는 시도로 해석될 수 있다. 동선언에서는 동북아의 비핵지대화과 해상군축 및 신뢰구축 등을 제안하는 동시에 캄란만의 소련해군기지 철수 등 동북아 평화구조 정책을 위한 실천적 대안들이 제시되었다. 특히 고르바초프는 동선언을 통하여 남·북한 문제에 보다 건설적인 정책대응을 보이기 시작했다. 종래의 친북한 일변도에서 벗어나 평화통일가능성을 강조하며 한국측 입장을 이해하는 동시에 한국과의 경제협력가능성을 시사했다.

그러나 소련 동북아정책에 있어서 결정적 전환을 가져온 것은 「고르바초프-노태우」간의 제주정상회담이다. 1941년 4월 19~20일 개최된 한·소정상회담은 한반도문제와 동북아정세에 몇가지 긍정적 영향을 미쳤다. 그 첫째로 남·북한 유엔동시가입의 계기가 마련되었다. 둘째로 제주정상회담을 기점으로 소련측은 북한의 핵사찰문제에 보다 적극적인 자세를 취하

기 시작했다. 세번째로 「한·소」 우호·선린조약체결합의는 한국과 소련 양국간의 유대를 강화시켜 주었고 한반도, 동북아, 그리고 국제문제 해결에 한국과 소련의 共助 가능성을 제고 시켜주었다. 마지막으로 제주정상회담은 한·소 경제협력의 새로운 지평을 열어주었다.

결론적으로 「블라디보스톡」에서 「제주」까지는 긴 여정이었다 하겠다. 비록 냉전의 타성과 유산이 아직도 아시아·태평양지역에 산재해 있지만 공동의 노력으로 극복하고 평화구조의 정착을 가속화 시킬 수 있을 것이다.